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Abstract—Data analytics and machine learning techniques are
being rapidly adopted into the power system, including power
system control as well as electricity market design. In this paper,
from an adversarial machine learning point of view, we examine
the vulnerability of data-driven electricity market design. More
precisely, we follow the idea that consumer’s load profile should
uniquely determine its electricity rate, which yields a clustering
oriented pricing scheme. We first identify the strategic behaviors
of malicious users by defining a notion of disguising. Based on
this notion, we characterize the sensitivity zones to evaluate the
percentage of malicious users in each cluster. Based on a thorough
cost benefit analysis, we conclude with the vulnerability analysis.
Index Terms—Electricity Market, Adversarial Machine Learn-
ing, Sensitivity Analysis
I. INTRODUCTION 1
The wide deployment of smart meters boosts the data
analytics’ penetration in power system operation, which is
reshaping the electricity economy’s landscape. However, the
technological limits in data analytics generate a sequence of
new risks, threatening the power system reliability, security,
and economic efficiency.
A. Opportunities and Challenges
The current primary impediment on widely utilizing data
analytics methods comes from the privacy concern. Such
concern is diminishing with the advance in privacy preserving
computation. In contrast, it has not attracted sufficient attention
on whether data analytics may generate new market loopholes
that can be utilized for market manipulation. In other words,
while more information from the demand side is able to
improve the market efficiency, it remains unknown if there
will be any strategic behaviors with a direct implementation
of machine learning algorithms in electricity market.
In this paper, we submit that utilizing the demand data can
lead to both efficiency improvement opportunity and new mar-
ket manipulation loophole. The detailed demand data enables
the system operator to use k-means clustering algorithm to
assess each customer’s marginal system impact, which serves
as the basis for a data-driven pricing scheme [1]. However, due
to the structure of resulted clusters, we identify the existence
of market manipulation.
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Fig. 1. Paradigm of Our Vulnerability Analysis
B. Related Work
The major body of related literature that uses machine
learning techniques for better power system operation focuses
on load prediction. Just to name a few, Kong et al. exploit
the temporal characteristics in residential load and propose an
LSTM (Long Short-Term Memory) load forecasting method in
[2]. Many deep learning models have also been employed for
more accurate load prediction, including pooling-based deep
recurrent neural network in [3], FFNN (Feed-Forward Neural
Network) in [4], DBN (Deep Belief Network) in [5], etc. Chen
et al. seek to integrate domain knowledge in different neural
network building blocks in [6]. Researchers have also used
machine learning to solve scheduling or dispatch problems
for electricity market. For example, Mocanu et al. propose
a deep reinforcement learning method to conceive an online
optimization for building energy management systems in [7].
Another line of research exploits opportunities in designing
better pricing schemes for demand side. Based on utility
maximization, Samadi et al. propose an optimal real-time
pricing algorithm for demand side management in [8]. By
combining hybrid particle swarm optimizer with mutation
algorithm, Xu et al. design a data-driven pricing scheme to
help the utility minimize peak demand in [9]. Exploiting
price elasticity of electricity consumption, Yu et al. develop
a parametric time-utility model to obtain the optimal real time
price and maximize the social welfare in [10]. Qian et al.
develop an SAPC (Simulated-Annealing-based Price Control)
algorithm to reduce the peak-to-average load ratio via a two-
stage optimization in [11].
Most studies on quantifying the risk caused by data focus on
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the cyber security, e.g., the false data injection attack [12], and
cyber attack on the topology errors [13] or simply incorrect
topology information [14]. In contrast to the literature, we seek
to understand the vulnerability in data-driven pricing schemes
by examining possible strategic behaviors.
C. Our Contribution
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to conduct
vulnerability analysis for data analytics application in the
electricity sector. The principal contributions of this paper are
highlighted as follows.
• Identify Strategic Behavior: We propose the definition of
disguising to contrast malicious users out of population.
This serves as basis for identifying strategic behaviors.
• Characterize Sensitive Zone: Definition of disguising
characterizes the sensitive zone for each cluster. We
seek to observe the impacts of different parameters of
disguising on shaping the sensitive zone.
• Vulnerability Analysis: Based on the sensitive zone char-
acterization and a thorough cost benefit analysis, we
conduct the vulnerability analysis for the cluster oriented
pricing scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
overviews the dataset and revisits the major conclusions in
using clustering for pricing. Based on this clustering approach,
we define disguising to identify strategic behaviors in Section
III. Section IV further quantifies the sensitive zones for each
cluster, which serves as the basis for our vulnerability analysis
in Section V. Finally, concluding remarks and future directions
are given in Section VI.
II. CLUSTERING FOR PRICING: THE BASICS
A good pricing scheme in general should reflect the user’s
impact on the marginal system cost. This inspires Yu et al. to
encode user’s load profile into the pricing scheme [1], which
yields the notion of clustering for pricing.
A. Determinant of System Impact
In power system operation, the daily system cost of produc-
ing energy is determined by the profile of system load, which
is the aggregate of individual load profiles. Hence, to evaluate
each individual user’s marginal impact on the system cost, we
only need to know the user’s load profile, the system profile,
and the system cost structure. In a large power system, the last
two pieces of information are almost invariant to individual
behaviors. Hence, the demand profile of each user is the only
determinant of its marginal system cost impact.
B. Profile-Based Pricing Strategy
Based on this observation, Yu et al. define the marginal
system cost impact (termed as MCI) using l1-norm:
MCIi = lim4→0
C(d + ∆ di||di||1 )− C(d)
4
=
24∑
t=1
dti∑24
m=1 d
m
i
λt,
(1)
where di =
{
d1i , ..., d
24
i
}
denotes the consumer i’s hourly
demand in a day; d is the aggregate load profile for the system;
C(d) denotes the system total cost given profile d, and Λ =
{λ1, ..., λ24} represents the real time hourly price in a day.
With the carefully chosen l1-norm in the definition of MCI,
Yu et al. submit that given the real time price Λ, the optimal
pricing strategy is to set each user’s daily average rate to its
own MCI. Hence, consumers with the same demand profile
should share the same retail price. This observation establishes
the basis for clustering.
C. Clustering: Implementation and Challenges
Empirical studies have shown that consumers do share
similar profiles over population [15], which implies that the
user load profiles can be clustered into limited types. The users
in the same cluster can share the same retail price, which eases
the pricing scheme implementation.
However, since the users in the same cluster do not share
exactly the same load profile, a data-driven pricing approach
always creates loophole allowing certain users to bypass to
other clusters for a better retail price. This motivates us to
examine such strategic behaviors by defining disguising.
D. Dataset Overview
Before diving into the details of analyzing the strategic
behaviors, we provide a brief overview on the dataset, which
we will use throughout the paper.
We use the Pecan Street data [16] of around 40 users (with
relatively good quality of data) from May 1 to Aug 8, 2015.
To better represent the clustering results for a large population,
we combine the daily data of all the users into one dataset to
obtain a larger dataset (3, 155 valid load profiles in total).
Different from the classical k-means clustering, we use l1-
norm to replace the Euclidean distance, in response to the def-
inition of MCI. More precisely, we use d̂i = (d̂1i ...d̂
h
i ...d̂
24
i ) ∈
R to denote daily energy consumption vector of user i.
To better highlight the observation that user’s load profile
uniquely determines user’s price, we first normalize each user’s
energy consumption according to l1-norm:
di =
d̂i
||d̂i||1
=
d̂i∑24
t=1 |d̂ti|
. (2)
We conduct the k-means clustering for normalized data, and
select k to be 30. Figure 2(a) plots the demand profiles for each
cluster center. We choose a small k for better illustration of
our subsequent ideas toward understanding strategic behaviors.
Nevertheless, the central profiles show interesting patterns. For
example, cluster 9 seems more like the classical load pattern
with 2 peaks: one in the noon time and the other at night.
However, this cluster only contain 75 out of the 3, 155 load
profiles. We can observe there are many more types of users,
including those who are more active at night (cluster 3, 12,
and 26).
C1: 64 C2: 171 C3: 34 C4: 328 C5: 66 C6: 127
C7: 73 C8: 118 C9: 72 C10: 80 C11: 68 C12: 99
C13: 154 C14: 108 C15: 75 C16: 157 C17: 114 C18: 40
C19: 71 C20: 67 C21: 65 C22: 44 C23: 91 C24: 157
C25: 49 C26: 75 C27: 170 C28: 199 C29: 158 C30: 61
(a)
Unstable Cluster
   Stable Cluster
(b)
Fig. 2. (a) Demand profile of each cluster center, the caption (Cn : N) of each sub figure implies that it is the central profile of cluster n, with N users in
the cluster (x-axis: time; y-axis: normalized load profile). (b)Disguise trajectories when θ = 0.01.
III. DISGUISING: STRATEGIC BEHAVIORS
Users may strategically change their load profiles for a
better price. We need to carefully define “strategic behaviors”.
If a user changes from a cluster center to another cluster center,
then its price should be determined by the second one and
this pricing scheme is efficient. However, some users may lie
on the boundary of two clusters, and hence they can conduct
minimal load profile modifications to switch to another cluster,
and potentially for a better price. We seek to define such
behaviors as disguising. We make the following assumption
to conduct the worst case analysis of strategic behaviors:
Assumption: All users know the global information, i.e., the
clustering results, including the central profile of each cluster
and its corresponding price.
We denote the center (load profile) of cluster j by cj , and
denote the cluster that user i belongs to by a function u(i).
To understand the strategic behavior, we need to examine the
effort that user i needs to spend on moving to another cluster
n 6= u(i). This effort can be characterized by a scalar λi,n.
User i can successfully switch to cluster n, as long as the
following condition holds:
||(1−λi,n)di+λi,ncn−cu(i)||1 ≥ ||(1−λi,n)(di−cn)||1, (3)
where the left-hand-side measures the distance between user
i’s modified profile ((1 − λi,n)di + λi,ncn) and the original
cluster center, and the right-hand-side measures the distance
between user i’s modified profile and the center of cluster
n. Hence, the minimal effort that user i needs to spend for
disguising can be solved by an optimization problem:
min
n 6=u(i)
inf λi,n
s.t. ||(1− λi,n)di + λi,ncn − cu(i)||1
≥ ||(1− λi,n)(di − cn)||1,
pn < pu(i),
(4)
where pn represents the price of cluster n (i.e.,MCIn).
For notational simplicity, we define
n∗i = arg min
n∈{1,...,k},n6=u(i)
inf λi,n. (5)
With such characterizations, we use an index CR to better
define disguising: for each users i, define
CRi = inf λi,n∗i . (6)
It is worth noting that in the optimization problem (4), we
intentionally do not choose to minimize the l1-norm between
modified profile and the original demand profile. Instead, we
choose to compare the two profiles’ distances to the target
cluster center n and define λi,n to reflect the ratio of the
two distances. This is our way to ‘normalize’ user’s efforts
to disguise among all clusters. This establishes the basis for
defining CRi. Formally,
Definition 1: User i has the ability to disguise if
CRi ≤ θ. (7)
Remark: In this parametric definition, the user’s strategic
behavior can be measured through a threshold θ. And such
threshold cannot be directly observed, but can be inferred
through observing the real strategic behaviors, or through
understanding how many users have such ability in response to
each threshold. This motivates us to characterize the sensitivity
zone based on our parametric definition of disguising.
We also want to emphasize that by considering the load
profile modification based on the normalized profile, we in-
tentionally ignore user’s possibility of disguising via reducing
energy consumption, which allows us to focus on understand-
ing shift load profile for disguising.
Figure 2(b) shows by only strategically adjusting 1% of
demand, how the users may disguise and change their clusters.
The arrows represent these changes in the clusters. The darker
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Fig. 4. Radius (rn(θ)) of Each Cluster Evolves with θ.
the cluster, the more stable the cluster is, which implies it is
more difficult for the users in the cluster to disguise.
IV. SENSITIVE ZONE CHARACTERIZATION
Sensitive zones include users that are more likely to modify
their load profiles and disguise themselves to belong to other
clusters. With the parametric definition of disguising, we
characterize the sensitivity zone from two aspects: the number
of users in the zone (Nn(θ)) and the radius of the stable zone
(rn(θ)), which is the complementary set of sensitive zone.
Specifically, we define, for each cluster n,
Nn(θ) :=
∑
i,u(i)=n
I(CRi ≤ θ), (8)
where I(·) is the indicator function.
rn(θ) := min
i
||cn − di||1
s.t. CRi ≤ θ,
u(i) = n.
(9)
Figure 3 plots how the percentage of users in the sensitive
zone varies with θ. Figure 4 plots the corresponding radius
(rn(θ)) evolving with θ. In the right hand side of the two
figures, we illustrate three interesting clusters (cluster 11, 20
and 23) for more observations.
Note that we focus on the profit-seeking strategy of dis-
guising, which is a strategy of obtaining a significant profit by
Fig. 5. Average Benefit with Different θ.
a negligible demand adjustment. Thus, we zoom in the cases
when θ grows from 0% to 15%. Figure 3 shows that users
can disguise only if they change at least 0.8% of their load
profiles. Together with Fig. 4, the two figures demonstrate
heterogeneous stability across clusters. For example, there
does not exist the strategic users in cluster 11 (as shown in Fig.
3(b)), which is a stable cluster, having a flat radius evolution
curve associated with the growth of θ (as shown in Fig. 4(b)).
Cluster 23 is an unstable cluster: the number of its strategic
users keep growing with θ’s increase while its stable radius
keeps on shrinking.
V. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
To better analyze the incentive of strategic behaviors, we
start by conducting the cost benefit analysis of disguising.
More precisely, we evaluate the user’s potential benefits of
disguising by focusing on user’s electricity costs and ignoring
the user’s other utilities (such as discomfort in changing load
profile, or the cost of using storage systems for disguising).
A. Cost Benefit Analysis
With d˜i,n, we can evaluate user i’s benefit of disguising
itself to be a cluster n user. Suppose user i has disguised itself
with a disguised profile d˜i,n, then its benefit can be measured
by the difference in electricity bills bi,n:
bi,n(µi,n) = pu(i)
∑24
t=1
dti − pn
∑24
t=1
d˜ti,n. (10)
Note that the value of θ reflects the difficulty as well as
the cost of disguising for a consumer. Whether the consumer
will disguise is also contingent on the magnitude of the asso-
ciated benefit. Hence, we conduct the cost benefit analysis by
examining the relation between θ and the associated average
benefit (as shown in Fig. 5).
The non-monotonic θ-benefit relation illustrates the strong
incentive for users to disguise. Note that the first impulse of
the benefit on the curve in Fig. 5 occurs when θ is only
1%, which is even higher than that when θ is 50%. The
dramatically high benefit associated with the 1% demand
change is the consequence of the disguising strategy’s exercise,
which further demonstrates the significance of the loopholes
induced by the algorithmic limits of the data-driven method.
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Fig. 6. Total Load with Different θ.
Furthermore, the dramatically high profit from the dis-
guising opportunity can even discourage the consumers from
fundamentally reshaping their demand profiles, which can
truly reduce the system cost. In Fig. 5, we also observe that
the marginal benefit remains at a low level when θ is up to
15%.
B. Vulnerability Analysis
Though easy to manipulate, the manipulation may improve
social welfare. However, in this section, we submit that the
manipulation may actually increase the system cost.
Figure 6 plots the total load in the system with different
θ. The system peak increases dramatically for fairly large θ
(θ > 0.4). This is rather counter intuitive as a larger θ implies
that the customers are following the system operator’s price
signal. The major reason for this market failure is due to the
price taker assumption in our model. When θ is large, the
change in the aggregate load profile is enough to affect the
real time price and hence the user’s marginal system impact.
However, a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this
paper. Instead, in this paper, we simply want to identify the
possibility that disguising may lead to a higher peak.
C. Generalization
We have focused on the analysis for the potential benefits of
disguising. More practically, we may define the utility function
ui(di,n) for user i as follows:
ui(di,n) = wi(di,n)− pn
∑24
t=1
dti, (11)
where wi(di,n) implies user i’s mentally happiness of con-
suming energy according to pattern di,n, and the second term
implies the electricity cost. Hence, we can accordingly update
user i’s benefits from disguising to be cluster n user as follows:
bi,n(ui,n) = ui(di)− ui(di,n). (12)
Remark: One possible form of wi(d˜) could be
wi(d˜i,n) = u
max
i − c ∗ ||d˜i,n − di||1. (13)
However, it is in general difficult to estimate user i’s mentally
happiness. Hence, in this paper, we restrict ourselves in
understanding the potential benefits of disguising.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper conducts the vulnerability analysis for data-
driven pricing schemes. Using a clustering oriented pricing
scheme as an example, we identify strategic behaviors by
defining disguising and analyze the impact of disguising on
a system level. We submit that disguising can be harmful to
the power system operation by leading to a higher peak.
This work can be extended in many ways. For example,
we assume each user has full knowledge of the clustering
results. It will be interesting to understand the condition when
users only know their neighboring clusters’ information. We
also intend to investigate the following research question:
will a user constantly have the ability to easily disguise for
profits? This requires a careful examination on the temporal
characteristics of the load profiles over a longer time span.
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